Recently, shared mobility has been proven to be an e ective way to relieve urban tra c congestion and reduce energy consumption. Despite the emergence of several nationwide platforms, the pricing schemes and the vehicle dispatching problem of such platforms are optimized in an ad hoc manner. In this paper, we introduce a general framework that incorporates geographic information and time-sensitive dynamic environment parameters (such as the dynamically changing demand) and models the pricing and dispatching problem as a Markov Decision Process with continuous state and action spaces. Despite of the PSPACE-hardness of general MDPs, we provide e cient algorithms nding the exact revenue (or welfare) optimal (potentially randomized) pricing schemes. We also characterize the optimal solution via primal-dual analysis of a convex program. Finally, we also discuss generalizing our model by showing how to reduce a wide range of general settings in practice to our model.
Introduction
The emerging applications of shared mobility, such as ride-sharing (e.g., Didi, 1 Uber, and Lyft), bike-sharing (e.g., Ofo and Mobike 2 , Citi Bike in NYC), and car-sharing (e.g., car2go and zipcar), have been proven to be an e cient way of resource usage and social welfare improvement [9] and intensive researches have been done on related topics [10, 17, 23] . Despite that many researches have been done around these applications, the optimal pricing schemes for the resource dispatching problem are still not well-understood. Traditional dispatching/pricing schemes for taxi [18, 13, 14] and airplane [12, 24, 20] do not capture the dynamic nature of the new system: (i) the dispatching system for these shared vehicles can make use of dynamic pricing to further boost revenue, while taxi fees are calculated from a xed function of traveling distance and time; (ii) the prices of ight tickets are sold via long booking periods, while the customers of shared vehicles make their decisions rather immediately.
In this paper, we rst model the vehicle dispatching in shared mobility as a pricing problem on a strongly connected digraph. The entire graph refers to a city and each node refers to a region in this city. Each directed edge refers to a pair of potential origin and destination that customers would travel along and an exogenous cost of a ride is associated with each edge. The action of the platform is to set a price for the rides along each directed edge at each time slot and the dispatching along such edges is induced by the customers who take the prices for their rides. The platform is given the demand curves along each edge at each time slot and aims at maximizing the objective, which could be revenue, social welfare, throughput, or even any convex combination of them.
Unlike some previous studies that consider drivers as sel sh agents [3, 11] , we consider the drivers to be not strategic meaning that they will not reject the rides with low prices (so they are more like employees of the platform). We remark that this is the nature of the bike-sharing and the car-sharing applications and even for the ride-sharing, 1 Didi Chuxing is a major ride-sharing company and is estimated to be worth $50 billion in April, 2017, becoming the world's second most valuable startup [16] . According to Wikipedia, "Didi Chuxing completed 1.4 billion rides milestone in just 2015 alone, as well as clocking over 200 million rides in December 2016 alone (one month), making it the most dominant ride-sharing company in the world. This far surpassed any other ride-sharing company, including Uber which completed only 1 billion rides in 6 years' time since its founding in 2009." https: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Didi_Chuxing 2 A $450M February 2017 funding round valued Ofo at $1 billion. Mobike raised $215 million in Series D funding, January 2017, and $600 million in Series E funding, June 2017. the mechanism design problem can be decomposed into the pricing problem for the rides (between the platform and customers) and the dynamic revenue sharing problem (between the platform and drivers) [2] . Therefore, the payout to the driver for each ride is almost independent of the price paid by the customer for this ride and hence the drivers are not sensitive to the prices.
The model we proposed then naturally induces a Markovian Decision Process (MDP) with the driver populations on each node as states, the throughputs along each edge as actions, and the objective (e.g., revenue, welfare, or throughput) as the rewards. While it is in general PSPACE-hard to solve MDPs, we come up with an e cient (polytime) algorithm that nds the exact optimal solution: We rst translate the demand curves along each edge into throughput-reward tradeo s (i.e., the maximum reward can be achieved along this edge with xed throughput), and then formulate the problem as an optimization with throughputs (along each edge at edge time slot) as variables.
In our algorithm, we resolve two major di culties: (i) we rst reduce the throughput-reward tradeo , which in general is not concave, to its convex hull by allowing for randomized pricing schemes (commonly adopted in mechanism design and easy to implement in practice), and (ii) then we solve the MDP with continuous state by formulating it as a convex program. In particular, all the constraints in the convex program are linear.
Dynamic Environment As the environment varies over time in practice, we allow the traveling cost along each edge, the valuation and demand of the customers along each source and destination pair, and even the total driver population (supply) over the graph to be di erent at each time period. Despite of the high complexity of the dynamics in such an environment, we are able to reduce any general instance to a restricted simply instance and the optimal solution of the general instance can be easily recovered from the optimal solution of the simpli ed instance (see Section 7) .
Our Contribution In this paper, we introduce a simple model for the dispatching problem that can be used for a wide range of general settings (see Section 7 for detailed discussions on the general settings and how they can be reduced to our simple model). To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to model the dynamic environment where the prior information of both the demand (e.g., frequent and values of requests), the supply (e.g., the driver population in ride-shares), and even the traveling costs may be di erent for each time period. Note that such dynamics commonly exist in practice [8] and add new challenges to the pricing and dispatching problem.
Within such a model, we then formalize the problem as a mathematical program with linear constraints by introducing the throughput-reward tradeo s (see Section 4) . Although in general the program is not convex, we convexify it by introducing randomized prices (see Section 3) and hence the optimal solution can be computed e ciently. One major merit of this approach is that one can easily introduce additional constraints to the problem with few change to the algorithm. For example, in practice, the supply might be asymmetric and correlated over time and the platform may want the distribution of the supply to be stationary in long run. 3 Finally, we also provide a characterization of the optimal solution via primal-dual analysis. In particular, a dynamic pricing scheme is optimal if and only if the marginal contribution of the throughput along each edge equals to the system-wise marginal contribution of additional supply minus the di erence of the long term contributions of unit supply at the origin and the destination (see Section 6).
Related Work
Driven by real-life applications, a large number of researches have been done regarding the ride-share markets. Some of them employ queuing networks to model the market [15, 3, 25] . Iglesias et al. [15] describe the market as a closed, multi-class BCMP queuing network which captures the randomness of customer arrivals. They assume that the number of customers is xed, since customers only change their locations but don't leave the network. In contrast, the number of customer are dynamic in our model and we only consider the one who asks for a ride (or sends a request to the platform). Banerjee et al. [3] also use a queuing theoretic approach to analyze the ride-share market and mainly focus on the behaviors of drivers and customers. They assume that drivers enter or leave the market with certain possibilities. Bimpikis et al. [6] take account for the spatial dimension of pricing schemes in the ride-share market. They price for each region and their goal is to rebalance the supply and demand of the whole market, but we price for each routing and aim to maximize the total revenue or social welfare of the platform. We also refer the readers to the line of researches initiated by [19] for the problems about the car-pooling in the ride-sharing systems [1, 26, 7] .
Many works on ride-sharing consider both the customers and the drivers to be strategic, where the drivers may reject the requests or leave the system if the prices are too low [3, 11] . As we mentioned, if the revenue sharing ratios between the platform and the drivers can be dynamic, then the pricing problem and the revenue sharing problem could be independent and hence the drivers are non-strategic in the pricing problem. In addition, the platform can also increase the pro t by adopting dynamic revenue sharing schemes [2] .
Another work closely related to ours is by Banerjee et al. [4] . Their work is concurrent and has been developed independently from ours. In particular, the customers arrive according to a queuing model and their pricing policy is state-independent and depends on the transition volume. Both their and our models are built upon the underlying Markovian transitions between the states (the distribution of drivers over the graph). The major di erences are: (i) our model is built for the dynamic environments with a very large number of customers (each of them is non-atomic) to meet the practical situations, while theirs adopts discrete agent settings; (ii) they overcome the non-convexity of the problem by relaxation and focus only on concave objectives, while we solve the problem via randomized pricing and transform the problem to a convex program; (iii) they prove approximation bounds of the relaxation problem, while we give exact optimal solutions of the problem by e ciently solving the convex program.
Model
We propose a discrete time model. Our model incorporates geographical information as well as requests and driver distributions. Two settings are considered: dynamic environments with a nite time horizon and static environments with a in nite time horizon.
Geographical information
We use a strongly connected digraph G = (V, E) to model regions of a city, where a node v ∈ V refers to a region. In particular, we will not distinguish the locations within the same region (i.e., at the same node). Each directed edge e = (s, t) refers to a pair of valid origin and destination and hence the graph G is not a planar graph in general. Each edge e ∈ E is associated with a cost c τ (e) ≥ 0 for completing the request from s to t, where τ denotes the time step. This cost may be the compensation for the driver's fuel cost or the emission pollutants from vehicles in reality. It is without loss of generality to assume that the travel time of each edge is exactly in a unit time (see Section 7 for discussions on the generalization to non-uniform traveling time settings). With this assumption, the drivers are always on some node of the graph (no driver is on the way between two nodes) at the end of each time step.
Drivers
For any v ∈ V, let w τ (v) be the number of drivers at node v at time step τ. We assume that the total number of drivers is very large, which is often the case in practice, and consider each of the driver to be non-atomic. Moreover, we normalize the total amount of drivers to be 1 and thus w τ (v) is a real number in [0, 1].
Requests
Each request is a tuple (e, x), where e = (s, t) represents that a passenger sends a request for a ride from node s to t, and x ≥ 0 is the passenger's value for the ride, i.e. the passenger is willing to pay at most x ≥ 0 for the ride. At the end of each time step, the platform determines a price p for each request, and the request is served if x ≥ p and rejected otherwise. Here we adopt the common setting of short live passengers, that is, the passenger only lives in the system during this ride (the ride ends immediately if being rejected).
We also assume that the number of requests in a time step is large and consider non-atomic requests. We normalize the number of requests on each edge with the total number of drivers on the graph. Note that the amount of requests on an edge e can be more than 1, if there are more requests on e than the total drivers on the graph. We use the demand function D τ (p|e) to describe the e ect of the price p. In particular, D τ (p|e) is the amount of served requests on e at time step τ, if the price is p. We also assume that D τ (p|e) is continuous and monotone decreasing with respect to the price p.
Prices and objectives
Aligned with the common practice, the platform is only allowed to set prices for the requests. In particular, the prices for requests along the same edge should be the same (while randomized prices drawn from the same distribution is allowed), but the prices for requests along di erent edges could be di erent. Thus the price is a function of e.
Once the price p(e) is set, a request (e, x) with x < p(e) will be rejected and the corresponding passenger leaves the system. A straightforward constraint for the pricing problem is that the amount of served requests that start from a node s must be more than the amount of drivers currently on s.
In this paper, we are interested in maximizing either the platform's revenue (sum of collected payments minus the costs) or the social welfare of the entire system (sum of the values of accepted requests minus the costs). While in general, our techniques work for any general objectives that is irrelevant of the driver distribution.
Dynamic and static environments
In the dynamic environment setting, the costs c τ (e) and the demand function D τ (p|e) change dynamically over time. We consider the nite horizon case where there are T discrete time steps and at each time step τ ∈ [T], the graph G is unchanged while c τ (e) and D τ (p|e) on each edge e might be di erent. We assume that c τ (e) and D τ (p|e) are known to the platform ahead of time.
In the static environment setting, we assume that c τ (e) and D τ (p|e) do not change over time (c τ (e) ≡ c(e) and D τ (p|e) ≡ D(p|e)). In this setting, we consider the in nite horizon case, and focus on stable policies that preserve a certain system state.
Problem Formulation
Since we normalize the total amount of drivers to be 1, we have:
Let q τ (e) = D τ (p τ (e)|e) be the ow (the amount of accepted requests) along edge e. Then p τ (e) = D −1 τ (q τ (e)|e) can be uniquely determined since the demand function is monotone decreasing. It is clear that
The above equation indicates that once the driver distribution w τ (v) and the price p τ (e) are given, the driver distribution for the next time step w τ+1 (v) is uniquely determined. Therefore, the dispatching problem can be formulated as an MDP (Markov decision process): driver distribution w τ (v) is the state of the graph, and the Equation 3.1 is the transition function which is implied by the prices and the states. Our goal is to dynamically set prices p τ (e) for each edge to maximize a certain objective function.
We consider a class of state-irrelevant objective functions in our model. A function is state-irrelevant if its value only depends on the request ows on each edge q τ (e) but not the state of the system w τ (v). Let g τ (q|e) be any such function. We will only use this function as our objective from now on and do not consider any speci c objective.
Remark 3.1. Note that a wide range of objectives, such as the revenue and the welfare, are included in our class of objectives:
• Revenue: g τ (q τ (e)|e) = (p τ (e) − c τ (e)) · q τ (e);
• Welfare: g τ (q τ (e)|e) = ∫ q τ (e) 0 (p τ (e) − c τ (e))dq.
Randomized pricing
We allow randomized decisions where the price p τ (e) is drawn from a distribution Q τ (p|e). Note that the randomization is performed per-request, thus the total ow along edge e at time step τ is E p τ (e) [q τ (e)]. Letĝ τ (q|e) (ironed objective function) be the smallest concave function that upper-bounds g τ (q|e) (see Figure 1 ). The following theorem enables us to drastically simply our model and use a deterministic ow q τ (e) at each edge as our decisions. Proof. By de nition of the functionĝ τ (q|e), we have:
Sinceĝ τ (q|e) is a concave function, applying Jensen's inequality yields:
Now it su ces to show that the upper boundĝ τ (q|e) is attainable. Ifĝ τ (q|e) = g τ (q|e), then setting a deterministic price p τ (e) such thatq = D τ (p τ (e)|e) achieves the optimal value. Otherwise, let I = (a, b) be the ironed interval (whereĝ τ (q|e) g τ (q|e), ∀q ∈ I butĝ τ (a|e) = g τ (a|e) and g τ (b|e) = g τ (b|e)) containingq. Thusq can be written as a convex combination of the two end points a and b: q = λa + (1 − λ)b. It is clear that the functionĝ τ is linear in the interval I. Therefore
Let p a and p b be the prices such that q a = D τ (p a |e) and q b = D τ (p b |e). The above equation indicates that if we set price p a with probability λ and p b with probability 1 − λ, we can achieve the optimal objective while at the same time ensure that the total ow in this time step is stillq.
Markov decision process
The driver distribution for the next time step w τ+1 (v) depends on the expected ows of the edges. Thus replacing the randomized decision Q τ (p|e) by a deterministic oneq does not a ect the state transition. And according to Theorem 3.2, randomized pricing can increase objective in some cases. In fact, the theorem implies that any optimal strategy with expected owq achieves an objective value ofĝ τ (q|e). And given an expected owq, we can quickly construct a randomized pricing scheme that achieves objectiveĝ τ (q|e). Therefore, we use the expected ow for each edge as our decisions from now on, and use the ironed functionĝ τ (q|e) to compute the objective. We also abuse notation and use q τ to denote the expected owq τ . Now we give the formal de nition of the dispatching problem. • A = [0, 1] |E | is the action space;
• W is Equation 3.1, which describes the state transition rule.
For the nite horizon setting, the objective function is:
For the in nite horizon setting, we consider the time-average objective:
Dynamic Environment
In this setting, we consider a more general case where the objective functionĝ τ (q|e) is time-dependent and we focus our attention on the nite time horizon case. Intuitively, the optimization problem here is to nd a "valid" time-dependent transition ow on the graph, q 1 (e), . . . , q T (e), that maximizes the accumulated objective:
Since for each e, the functionĝ τ (q|e) is a concave function, the objective above is also a concave function with respect to the ows.
Convex program formulation
We show that all the "valid" ows can be characterized by a set of linear constraints and hence the optimization program is a convex program with linear constraints.
Variables There are two types of decision variables in our program:
• q τ (e): the amount of drivers moving along edge e during period τ;
• w τ (v): the amount of drivers located at node v at the beginning of period τ.
Constraints We need the following three types of constraints:
• The total number of drivers on the graph must be 1 at any time.
v ∈V
• The state transition: the amount of drivers at a node is equal to that of the previous time step, plus the arriving driver ow and minus the leaving driver ow.
• The amount of drivers leaving any node v in an time step cannot exceed the amount of drivers that is currently at the node.
It is easy to see that any "valid" transition ow must follow the constraints above. On the other hand, any set of variables satisfying all the constraints above must correspond to a "valid" transition ow.
To summarize, we have the following convex program:
Alternating the constraints In practice, there could be some alternative or additional constraints (see Section 7 for further discussions). As long as the new constraints are linear, the optimal solution can still be computed e ciently. For example, one can add constraints to specify a minimum/maximum amount of drivers at some place in certain period, or xed initial and nal distributions of drivers on the graph. Both are quite important in practice.
Static Environment
In this setting, we restrict our attention to the case where the objective function does not change over time, i.e. ∀τ ∈ [T],ĝ τ (q|e) ≡ĝ(q|e). We aim to nd optimal stationary policies that maximize the objective function, i.e., the decisions q τ depends only on the current state w τ . The state space of our MDP problem is the set of all driver distributions over the nodes V. Traditional solutions such as value iteration and policy iteration [5] can not handle uncountable state spaces such as ours. A natural idea is to discretize the state space and nd an approximately optimal policy. However, even with discretizations, such algorithms su er from unacceptable computational costs. Recently, deep reinforcement learning grows rapidly and succeeds in many application. However, training a deep neural network, such as deep Q-learning network [21] or asynchronous advantage actor-critic (A3C) [22] is also time consuming. However, with the introduction of the ironed objective functionĝ τ , we can restrict our attentions on stable dispatching schemes and we show that for any discretization scheme, the optimal stationary policy of the induced discretized MDP is dominated by a stable dispatching scheme.
De nition 5.1. A stable dispatching scheme is a pair of state and policy (w τ , π), such that if policy π is applied, the following conditions are satis ed:
• stability: the state w τ is a stable state, i.e. for any v ∈ V,
where q τ = π(w τ ). 
is a nite subset of S, and A d is a nite subset of A that contains all feasible transition ows between every two states in S d . Lemma 5.3. Let DM and M be a discretized MDP and the corresponding original MDP. Let π d : S d → A d be a optimal stationary policy of DM. Then there exists a stable dispatching scheme (w, π), such that the time-average objective of π in M is no less than that of π d in DM.
Proof. Consider policy π d in DM. Starting from any state in S d with policy π d , let {w τ } ∞ 0 be the subsequent state sequence. Since DM has nitely many states and policy π d is a stationary policy, there must be an integer n, such that w n = w m for some m < n and from time step m on, the state sequence become a periodic sequence. De nē
Denote by π d (w k |e) or q d (e) the ow at edge e of the decision π d (w k ). Sum the transition equations for all the time steps m ≤ k < n, and we get:
Also, policy π d is a valid policy, so ∀v ∈ V and ∀m ≤ k < n:
Summing over k, we have:
Now consider the original problem M. Let w =w and π be any stationary policy such that:
• π(w) =q;
• starting from any state w w, policy π leads to state w within nitely many steps.
Note that the second condition can be easily satis ed since the graph G is strongly connected. With the above de nitions, we know that (w, π) is a stable dispatching scheme. Now we compare the objectives of the two policies π d and π. The time-average objective function is not sensitive about the rst nitely many immediate objectives. And since the state sequences of both policies π d and π are periodic, Their time-average objectives can be written as: Since the functionĝ(x|e) is concave, we have: With Lemma 5.3, we now only focus on stable dispatching schemes. We formulate the problem of nding an optimal stable dispatching scheme as a convex program with linear constraints:
Becauseĝ(q|e) is concave, the program is convex. Since all convex programs can be solved in polynomial time, our algorithm is polynomial.
Characterization of Optimality
In this section, we characterize the optimal solution via dual analysis. For ease of presentation, we focus on the dual program in the static environment with in nite horizon while remark that the characterization directly extends to the optimal solution in dynamic environments.
Primal: 
where v and v are the origin and destination of e, i.e., e = (v, v ).
According to the rst order KKT conditions, we havê
The above variables can be interpreted as follows:
•ĝ (q * |e): the marginal contribution (of ow) along edge e.
• λ * : the system-wise marginal contribution of driver population. Note that by the complementary slackness, if λ * > 0, the sum of the total ow must be 1, meaning all drivers are busy. Otherwise, there would be some idle drivers.
• µ * v : per period potential contribution of unit driver at node v. One can think that if we allow the out ow from node v to be slightly more than the in ow to node v, then µ v is the contribution of injecting some drivers into the system at node v.
Generalizations
Despite of the simple structure of our model, it is exible enough to extend to many practically important generalizations.
Non-uniform distances As we mentioned while introducing our model, the uniform distance assumption is enforced to simplify the presentation and is not necessary for our techniques to work. More concretely, we show how to construct an instance of our simpli ed model from any given instance with more general conditions, such as non-uniform distances.
Formally, suppose the traveling time along e = (s, t) is d > 1. Then we can add d − 1 auxiliary nodes into the graph, i.e., v e 1 , . . . , v e d−1 , and the directed edges connecting them, i.e., E = {(s, v e 1 ), (v e 1 , v e 2 ), . . . , (v e d−2 , v e d−1 ), (v e d−1 , t)}
To ensure the routing behavior being consistent with the non-uniform distance instance, we need to split the objective of traveling along e to the new edges, i.e., each new edge has objective function g(q|e ) = 1 dĝ (q|e), ∀e ∈ E It is not hard to verify that by the above reduction, we can get an instance of our simpli ed model with size at most d * times of the original graph, where d * is the maximum traveling time along one edge in the non-uniform distance instance. In particular, there is a straightforward bijection between the dispatching behaviors of the original and constructed instances. Hence we can always recover the optimal solution on the constructed instance to an optimal solution on the original instance.
Dynamic driver population Similar to the uniform distance assumption, in our framework, we can safely remove the constraint on the xed driver population. Instead, we can apply di erent constraints on the driver population in di erent periods, or one single constraint that speci es the total driver population accumulated overtime. In particular, we nd the following special cases quite interesting:
• Fixed total driver population accumulated overtime. To do this, one can simply replace the driver population constraints on each period to one single constraint on the total accumulated driver population. In fact, such a constraint can be interpreted as that there is a xed driver work hour supply. According to [8] , it is a very realistic assumption given that most drivers have their xed target working time per week.
• Unlimited driver supply, but with increasing marginal cost. In stead of placing a hard constraint on the driver supply, it is more realistic to allow the platform to have unlimited power of attracting more drivers but at increasing marginal cost. To incorporate this with our convex program, one can simply remove the hard driver population constraints and subtract the additional marginal cost of attracting more drivers from the objective. As long as the marginal cost is weakly increasing, the new program is still convex.
